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Dr. Mark Jaccard's gen erally helpful summary of the present upheaval in the electricity business, 'Changing Canadian Electricity Markets and the Future Role of Government' (ESR 6:2, 1994) , contains a mischaracterization of Energy Probe's position on electricity restructuring. In fact, far from th e impression Dr. Jaccard's article leaves, it would seem that he actually favours Energy Probe's proposals for reform.
Energy Probe does not advocate d eregulation of th e "en tire electricity sector" as Dr. Jaccard suggests (p. 118). Rather, w e advocate increased regulation of many aspects of Ontario's elec tricit y se ctor an d partial p rivatization of s ome as pects. We arg ue that Ontario Hydro's conventional generation -hydraulic and fossil-fired -should be privatized, and th e bulk power m arket opene d to com petition. We do not expect that nuclear generation could ever be privatized. Regardless of ownership, we argue that th e finan cia l m an agement of nuclear ge n eration shou ld b e closely regulated. Transmission, distribution, and dispatch sh ould also b e publicly regulat ed -unlike th e status quo in Ontario -regardless of ownership. Energy Pr obe adv ocates restr ucturing th e electricity sector along th e lin es of Ontario 's n atural ga s sec tor -an excellen t w or king exam ple of th e benefits that can be achieved by parsing an industry into its competitive Dr . Jaccard 's suggestion tha t Energy Probe argue s th at "envir onmental problems should be taken care of separately" can be misunderstood. We argue, based on the UK experience, that many of the most pernicious environmental problems associa ted with our elec tricity sys tem w ill be allevia ted b y our structural reforms. We do argue (for electricity and natural gas) that the en vironmental externalities which remain, after w eed ing out those externalities caused by allocative inefficiency, ought to be dealt wi th in regula tory fora ou ts ide rate regu la tio n . Energy Probe's argumen t th at rate regula tors ar e poorly p lace d to be environmental regulators is not an argument for weak env ironmental regulation. For example, Energy Probe is Canada's leadin g advocate of stricter env iro n me ntal and safety regula tion for nuclear power.
Energy Probe's interest in competition, strengthened regulation, and partial privatization of electric power is not driven b y ideology, bu t by the d esire for effective means to end the present system's ab use of both cons umers an d th e en vironment.
The rationale for continuing government control of Ontario Hydro does not fit Dr. Jaccard's generalization that the main ration ales for government in tervention in th e electricity sector are promoting the public good, contro lling natural monopoly, and managing externalities. Ontario Hydro'S monopoly remains unregulated. Its m onopoly power is now reinforced by th e ability to offer d iscriminatory ra tes to preferred customers. Recovery of th e de bt overhang caused by nuclear and coa l investments po ses a major barrier to managing externalities. Rather than th e rationales Dr . Jaccard ascribes, Ontario Hydro's persistence under public con tr ol is d ue more to government's attraction to controllin g eco n omi c "levers" for p olitical p urposes, government's unwillingness to realize th e likely shortfall should H ydro 's assets be valued in the market, and uncertainty over ownership.
Th ese criticisms aside, Energy Probe welcomes Dr. Jaccard's support for our core prescrip tions: competition in generation and public-interest regulation of transmission and distribution .
